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Ohio Northern University
Law Review
Student Case Notes
Packingham v. North Carolina
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment1 ensures the freedom of speech which may not be
abridged by the United States government. However, there are particular
instances in which it is necessary and proper for the legislature to enact laws
restricting speech in order to protect other liberties.2 These permissible
restrictions on speech vary based on several factors, including the forum in
which the restriction is imposed.3 In the traditional public forum, the state
typically may enforce a content-neutral restriction on speech, restricting the
time, place, and manner of speech, so long as the regulations “are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication.”4
Traditionally, the rule regarding the traditional public forum was that a
street or a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First
Amendment rights.5 While these places are still essential in the spatial
context of where one might have access to exercise these rights, arguably a
fairly limited amount of speech is exercised on streets or parks in our
current culture. Instead, perhaps the most significant forum for the
exchange of information and individual opinions is the Internet, and more
specifically, social media.6 This inexpensive and instantaneous method of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
3. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 596, 672 (1987) (citing Perry Educ.
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)).
4. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
5. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (discussing when the
government may regulate speech in a traditional public forum).
6. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 868 (1997)).
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communication allows for users to engage in a variety of activities, most of
which are protected by the First Amendment, just as they would be
protected in the traditional public forum.7 Applying the same standard used
in the established traditional public forum for content-neutral speech, the
Supreme Court in Packingham v. North Carolina found North Carolina’s
statute8 banning the use of commercial social networking sites by registered
sex offenders unconstitutional.9
Packingham is one of the initial Supreme Court cases to address the
relationship between the First Amendment and the Internet.10 Using the
already established standard of intermediate scrutiny to assess the
constitutionality of this statute, the Court has made the first step in
determining what parameters are to be set around Internet speech.10
However, the concurrence cautions the Court that this may be too broad of a
ruling, and with the Internet being a vast and expansive place, the
implications of such a ruling may not yet be known.11
II. STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2008 the North Carolina legislature enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14202.5, which made the use of “‘commercial social networking Web site
where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to
become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages’” a felonious
offense.12 The expansive criteria include the site being operated by a person
who derives revenue from the site, facilitating social introductions between
two or more persons, allowing personal profiles to be created containing
personal information that may be accessed by other users, and providing a
mechanism for communication with other users.13 The statute allows for
two exceptions: where the site’s primary purpose is to facilitate commercial
transactions or the site involves only one discreet service, such as email or
photo-sharing.14
One affected registered sex offender was Lester Gerrard Packingham
(hereinafter “Packingham”) from North Carolina.15 In 2002 Packingham
pled guilty to “taking indecent liberties with a child,” an offense which
required him to register as a sex offender in accordance with the state’s

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2009).
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738.
Id. at 1736.
Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1733.
Id.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734.
Id.
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registration statute.16 About eight years after Packingham’s plea and
required registration, an officer within the Durham Police Department was
tasked with investigating registered sex offenders who were believed to be
violating the statute prohibiting membership and use of commercial social
networking sites.17 Under a false alias, Packingham was a member of
Facebook, a commonly used commercial social networking website within
the meaning of the statute.18 It was under this alias account where
Packingham posted a public message about a court appearance he had in
which the judge dismissed his parking ticket.19 By matching up the false
name and the time of the post with the true identity and the time of the
dismissed parking ticket, the Durham Police Department was able to show
enough cause to obtain a warrant and was able to connect the alias on
Facebook to Packingham.20
A grand jury indicted Packingham for his violation of the commercial
social networking site statute and the trial court denied a motion to dismiss
for violation of Packingham’s First Amendment rights.21 The court of
appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, stating the statute was “not
narrowly tailored to serve the State’s legitimate interest.”22 The North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision, ruling that
the sex offender ban from the commercial social networking site statute was
constitutional because it was carefully tailored and allowed for alternative
means of communication on the Internet.23 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.24
III. COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. The Majority Opinion – Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in which Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.25 Justice Alito wrote
separately, concurring in judgment with which Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas joined.26 Newly appointed Justice Gorsuch took no part in
16. N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.6(a), 14-208.7 (referring to lifetime and general registration
requirements for criminal offenders residing in North Carolina).
17. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (quoting State v. Packingham, 229 N.C. App. 293, 304
(2013)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1733.
26. Id.
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the consideration of the case.27 The majority utilized the intermediate
scrutiny standard of review on the basis that the statute in question
constituted a content-neutral limitation on speech.28 This standard calls for
a statute to be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest”
and it may not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
prevent whatever act the state is trying to prevent.29 Applying this
intermediate scrutiny test, the Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional as the state was unable to show a legitimate government
interest, failed to carry its burden of proof that the statute was narrowly
tailored to directly advance its interest, and that the regulation was the least
restrictive means to accomplish the state’s interest.30
The state argued that the broad restrictions in the statute were required
to achieve its preventative purpose, namely, that it must prevent the sexual
predation of children.31 Even under intermediate scrutiny, the regulation of
the time, place, and manner in which the speech occurred was not overly
broad.32 The state cited Burson v. Freeman in which this Court upheld a
prohibition on political campaigns continuing to campaign within 100 feet
of a polling place.33 Finding that Burson did not support the present case,
Justice Kennedy distinguished the two, noting that Burson involved a
limited speech restriction, the burden of which was outweighed by the need
to protect another fundamental right, rather than a restriction that is
burdensome for a particular state interest.34 Burson was a constitutional
compromise, balancing the right to vote with the right to freedom of
speech.35 This analogy failed against Packingham, as there was not another
constitutional right being balanced here.36
Justice Kennedy then postulated that a better analogy for the present
case would derive from the reasoning in Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los
Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.37 In Jews for Jesus, the Court found that the
total ban of “First Amendment activities” at the Los Angeles International
Airport was not constitutional because the ordinance covered all protected
and non-disruptive speech.38 Being a single private location and not
allowing for such a broad ban on speech, it naturally follows that in the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733.
Id. at 1736.
Id.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
Id. at 1738 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)).
Id. at 1738.
Id.
Id.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (citing Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 569).
Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574.
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present case, where the state attempted to ban speech from virtual locations,
which exist nowhere and everywhere at once, the ban is far too broad.39
Additionally, the majority equated the Internet with that of traditional
and quintessential public forums, such as public streets and parks.40 The
Internet, and social media more specifically, is the fastest and most
prevalent way for people to find jobs, debate current matters of the day, and
engage directly and instantaneously with elected officials.41 Due to the
nature of the Internet, it provides people with a way to make their voices
heard more than ever before.42 This ability to access “vast realms of human
thought and knowledge” is important for all Americans, but can be
especially important for those who are convicted criminals, as a way for
them to reintegrate into the society in which we live and gives them the
ability to connect to a world of ideas.43 A total ban from this vast network
of thought and communication is unprecedented, yet gives an outer
boundary for what Internet speech may be regulated by a state.44
Though not presently before the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that a
state may enact more specific laws than this one in order to prevent the
sexual abuse and exploitation of minors.45 The Court cited Brandenburg v.
Ohio stating that, “[s]pecific criminal acts are not protected speech even if
speech is the means for their commission.”46 This must be balanced,
however, with the notion that “[t]he Government may not suppress lawful
speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.”47 Essentially, the Court
stated that a state may have a legitimate interest in suppressing speech that
may result in the sexual predation of children, and that such speech may be
trammeled, yet the state’s regulations must be narrowly tailored to restrict
specific speech acts, and not entirely close a vast arena for speech
completely.48
B. The Concurring in Judgment – Justice Alito
The concurrence delivered by Justice Alito, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas joined, supported the majority in the judgment,
39. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738.
40. Id. at 1735.
41. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (citing Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner) (using governors of all 50 states and members of Congress as
examples of the extent the Internet has one the ability to communicate with elected officials).
42. Id. at 1737 (“They allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town crier with a
voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’” (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)).
43. Id.
44. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
47. Id. at 1738 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 239, 255 (2002)).
48. Id. at 1737.
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but warned against interpreting the “undisciplined dicta” too broadly.49
Justice Alito primarily expressed concern with the “loose rhetoric” of the
majority.50 In equating the whole of the Internet with that of the traditional
public forum, the majority failed to address the specificity that is involved
within the Internet.51 Justice Alito noted key differences between the virtual
world and the physical world, namely the visibility of the latter.52 In the
physical world, it is much easier to prevent criminals from attempting their
crimes due to the visibility in its occurrence.53 The Internet however,
provides a veil under which a sexual predator may cloak himself or herself
in virtual anonymity that may not be a possibility in reality.54 Because the
majority fails to make this distinction, the concurrence warned that there
should be more specificity in the sites that are off limits to registered sex
offenders.55
Justice Alito would have the Court define more specific parameters for
websites that are unlawful for sex offenders to access.56 The current statute
would broadly include such a range of benign websites that are “unlikely to
facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a child,” namely sites such
as Amazon.com, WebMD, and the Washington Post online.57 The
concurrence listed those sites as ones that fit within the definition of a
commercial social networking website under the North Carolina statute, yet
due to the purpose and usage of these sites, they are “ill suited for use in
stalking or abusing children.”58
The danger that must be identified here is that the Internet, if it is to be
equated with the traditional public forum, should not be viewed
simplistically as one large space within which a state cannot restrict speech;
rather, the Internet must be further subdivided.59 According to Justice Alito,
there is a difference between sites such as Amazon.com and social media
sites that are geared toward a minor audience.60 The majority fails to
distinguish between the variety of sites, giving an overarching statement
that a state may enact more specific laws regarding the restriction of sex
offenders access to social media without further defining the types of sites

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1743.
Id. at 1738.
Id. at 1743.
Id.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1743 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1741-42.
Id. at 1743.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1743.
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that could be restricted.61 The overall argument made by the concurrence
was that while First Amendment protections on the Internet are necessary,
there should be caution in applying the Court’s free speech precedents to the
Internet as a whole.62 Because the full dimensions of the Internet are
unknown at the present time, Justice Alito warned the Court that too broad
of a protection within cyberspace may not reflect the circumstances for
which protections are meant to be afforded.63
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court has generally been hesitant to address the
relationship between the Internet and the First Amendment.64 Very few
cases decided by the Supreme Court have analyzed the issue of what
Internet speech may be regulated and when such regulation may occur. As
the Internet is a vast and virtual space, it is difficult to stricture boundaries
by which speech can or should be limited. As the Internet has evolved over
the past few decades, the commercial nature of the Internet has created a
virtual marketplace and social forum.65 This evolution changes the ways in
which people interact with and on the Internet. The Court realized that the
“Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions” and due to this
realization, are unwilling to make a determination that may soon be
obsolete.66
In spite of this stance typical of the Supreme Court, the decision in
Packingham does address current concerns in the relationship between the
Internet and the First Amendment, setting a standard by which the
government may regulate content-neutral Internet speech.67 The decision in
Packingham required the Court take a stance on Internet speech, the
repercussions of which are many. The globalization of the Internet and the
new parameters by which the government may regulate American’s online
speech is unprecedented. This note will discuss the Court’s previous stance
on regulating Internet speech, where Packingham might lead the Court and
other governmental bodies going forward, and a state’s interest in protecting
minor children by offering solutions that do not trammel protected speech.
61. Id. at 1738.
62. Id. at 1744.
63. Id.
64. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
65. Boundless, Global Marketing and the Internet, BOUNDLESS MKTING (Aug. 30, 2017, 10:41
AM), https://www.boundless.com/marketing/textbooks/boundless-marketing-textbook/global-marketing7/global-marketing-mix-56/global-marketing-and-the-internet-286-6895/.
66. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
67. Id.
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B. Expansion Of Prior Law
The Court has been cautious in its review and application of First
Amendment restrictions in relation to the Internet, Packingham being one of
the first in this arena to be granted certiorari.68 Packingham effectively
expanded the Court’s current stance on Internet speech restrictions, having
previously ruled on content-based Internet speech restrictions.69 The Court
generally ruled on cases involving legislation protecting minors from being
exposed to indecent material on the Internet such as the Communications
Decency Act, Child Pornography Prevention Act, and the Child Online
Protection Act.70 All of these laws are related to children and pornographic
material on the Internet.71 While those laws were enacted in order to protect
children, the laws were subjected to strict scrutiny, the highest standard of
review, because they contained content-based restrictions.72 While in the
same vein as the speech discussed in Packingham, strict scrutiny review is
just that, strict, making it difficult for government actors to achieve their
goal of restricting Internet speech.73
Most restrictions on speech on the Internet do not emanate from the
government, but from private corporations that own and regulate users of
their social media sites.74 These privatized restrictions on Internet speech
are favored due to a “presumption in favor of the enforceability of a
contract.”75 By contracting over terms of use, rather than terms being
delineated by a governmental entity, the commercial and marketplace nature
of the Internet thrives within its own structure.76 Many social media sites
require the user to agree to terms of service in order to fully access the
benefits of the site. These social media sites have built into their user
agreements specific rules regarding speech acts their users are allowed to
engage in, as well as provided a mechanism for the site to remove an
68. Id.
69. See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234 (holding that provisions in the Child Pornography
Protection act were too broad under a strict scrutiny standard, and therefore unconstitutional); see also
Reno, 521 U.S. at 239 (holding that breadth of the provisions in the Communications Decency Act
“lack[] the precision that the First Amendment requires” and ultimately the State did not meet its burden
for regulating content-based speech).
70. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 239; see Reno, 521 U.S. at 858-59.
71. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230 (1998); Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18
U.S.C. 2251 (1996); Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 231 (1998).
72. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230 (1998); Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18
U.S.C. 2251 (1996); Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 231 (1998).
73. Reno, 521 U.S. at 879.
74. Alice E. Marwick, Are There Limits To Online Free Speech?, DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Jan.
5, 2017), https://points.datasociety.net/are-there-limits-to-online-free-speech-14dbb7069aec.
75. Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amendment Scrutiny of
Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 949 (2014).
76. Id.
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uncooperative person’s access to an account. For example, the social media
site Facebook prohibits users from engaging in “hate speech” and removes
accounts containing this prohibited content.77 The social media site Twitter
recently suspended accounts linked to a neo-Nazi website.78
The
privatization of Internet speech regulation is essential in a free market as it
allows companies to dictate their own business practices. The decision in
Packingham adopts a new avenue for government regulation, allowing the
government to interfere with individual social media entities and their
ability to regulate speech that occurs on their websites.
The Court has also cautiously side-stepped recent cases involving
student Internet speech, denying certiorari in many recent cases.79 In
several instances, schools have enacted regulations that limit off-campus
Internet speech by students.80 Many lower courts have relied on and
expanded the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist.81 In Tinker, the Court held that students’ on-campus speech could
be regulated under specific circumstances, namely the substantial disruption
standard which stated a school may regulate a student’s on-campus speech
if it can be reasonably forecasted that a substantial disruption or material
interference would occur in the school, and some disruption did in fact
occur.82 This substantial disruption must interfere with the operation of the
school, and not be a mere desire to avoid discomfort and unpleasantness in
the school environment.83 Several lower courts have tried to expand this
substantial disruption test to off-campus discourse based on the proposition
that speech that originates off-campus nevertheless simultaneously exists
on-campus because of the invasive virtual nature of the Internet.84 This
paradoxical viewpoint could lead to increasingly absurd results, such as
campuses attempting to regulate the off-campus Internet speech of nonstudents on the theory that all Internet communications are reasonably
forecasted to breach the borders of the campus causing disruption; a result
the Court has aimed to avoid through its lack of review of off-campus
speech cases.
77. David Ingram, Twitter Shutters Accounts of U.S. White Supremacy Website, REUTERS (Aug.
16, 2017, 9:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/virginia-protests-tech-idUSL2N1L21N5.
78. Id.
79. See generally Bell v. Itowamba, 799 F.3d 379 (2015), petition for cert. filed, (15-666), 2016
LEXIS 475.
80. Dunkley v. Bd. Of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 485, 492 (2016) (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty.
Sch., 652 F.3d 565, at 568-69 (4th Cir. 2011)) (referring to school-implemented policy for harassment,
which reaches students’ off-campus speech).
81. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
82. Id. at 512-13.
83. Id. at 509.
84. See generally C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016) (considering
whether a school can regulate students’ off-campus speech).
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The cases and ideals of the Court pre-Packingham show a Court
resistant to deciding the extent to which a state has the ability to regulate
Internet speech. Packingham has carved out a new direction for the Court,
sending forth a definitive standard by which governmental bodies may now
tailor their laws in order to gain more control and power over speech
disseminated over the Internet.85
C. Forecasted Effect On Future Decisions
In this relatively new realm of cyberspace, and the new potential
government influence and dominion in limiting speech within it, creates
difficulty in pinning down and defining the depth with which the
government may regulate the online speech of an individual. The test
placed before us by the Packingham Court gives the outer perimeter, but
how far wide the reach is to that perimeter is not yet known. The virtual,
nontangible nature of the Internet adds to the difficulty of determining just
where a governmental body may reach out and attempt to take hold.86
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a government agent need only put into
effect a law that is both narrowly tailored to and includes a substantial
government interest.87 The low threshold of this standard paired with a
multitude of state actors who may implement new laws under the guise of
substantial government interest or of being narrowly tailored may be
detrimental to individuals’ speech protections. Individuals should be on
notice that these laws might come into being and courts must prepare for an
influx of claims against laws restricting Internet speech. The Internet is a
different world than our physical world.88 The vastness yet closeness of it
in our daily lives creates a difficult task for government actors desiring to
help protect the rights of some individuals, while ousting others.
Under the privatized “terms of use” contract system, access to the
Internet as a public forum exists in a “take it or leave it” situation. Just as a
person need not enter a business she does not like nor enter a park where
she witnesses people demonstrating their First Amendment rights, the same
is true with the Internet. If she does not like the “terms of use” for a
particular site, she may find another one or even create her own website,
giving her a place within the expanse of the Internet to exercise her right to
protected speech.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
Id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring).
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss1/6

10

Burnette-McGrath: PACKINGHAM V. NORTH CAROLINA

2018]

PACKINGHAM V. NORTH CAROLINA

127

The troubling issue that arises out of the holding in Packingham occurs
when a state meets the intermediate scrutiny standard.89 When this occurs,
there is no longer a “take it or leave it” option to access the particular forum
on an individual’s own volition. Under this standard, access is barred from
this forum. The Court in Packingham failed to give further examples of
classification for what status an individual might need in order to be
prevented from access to certain Internet sites. The only status addressed
in Packingham was a criminal status.90
The Court briefly mentioned in dicta an issue with the state’s attempt to
enforce severe restrictions on Internet speech for persons who have already
served their sentences for their crimes.91 While not binding authority, it is
important to note the Court’s dislike and caution in identifying a status of
people in which the state may restrict access to an Internet forum. The state
seemed to equate the status of registered sex offender to someone who is
still under the supervision of a court through this additional restriction on
speech.92 Persons who are currently incarcerated are not afforded the same
protections as those who are outside a court’s supervision.93 However, once
a person has completed her sentence, she is not under the control of a court
and has expanded access to her fundamental rights, including the freedom
of speech. While Second Amendment rights are quelled post-incarceration
by felonious status, the First and Fourth Amendments do not loosen their
grasp due to felonious status.94 This Court has not held that a person’s First
Amendment right is trammeled by this status, and in fact encourages the use
of the Internet as a way of integrating back into society and finding a job.95
The idea of not restricting a person’s rights post-incarceration is
welcome amidst the vast possibilities of speech restrictions available after
this case. Looking forward in light of the Packingham decision, there are
other ways a state may serve its legitimate interest in protecting children
without quelling a registered sex offender’s (or any other status offender’s)
right to free speech.

89. Packingham, 173 S. Ct. at 1736.
90. Id. at 1737.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“[W]e have held that even when an institutional
restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the practice must
be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional
security.”).
94. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008).
95. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
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D. Alternatives To Restricting Registered Sex Offenders’ Internet
Speech
The Court in Packingham recognized that the state had a legitimate
interest in protecting minor children from potential sexual predators on the
Internet.96 However, as an alternative to the denial of full access to
commercial social media sites,97 states enacting laws with the goal to protect
minor children from sex offenders could amend their registration statutes to
include a requirement for those who must register to provide a list of any
social media site they are a member of, as well as requiring their full legal
name to be used on the site.98 The legal name requirement allows members
of the forum, in which the registered sex offender is also a member, the
ability to look up that person’s already published registration status. As
registered sex offenders are already required to publish publicly their status
as such,99 the additional name requirement online does not infringe on their
ability to access and engage in the forum in which speech is freely
exchanged.100 Rather, it fosters a state’s interest in protecting minor
children from predation, as the name of whomever may come into contact
with them is easily searchable in order to discover any suspicious or mal
intent.
In light of the Packingham decision, a state may decide to restrict
Internet speech in order to achieve its interest. However, the decision by
this Court to allow Internet speech regulation by the government as long as
it meets the test of intermediate scrutiny is not the only way a state may
further its legitimate interest. The Court does not foreclose on a state’s
ability to add or alter its current statutes to include more elements. This
alternative would allow a state to both protect children and protect the
speech rights typically afforded to individuals in a public forum.
V. CONCLUSION
The future of the government’s restriction on Internet speech is as
expansive as the Internet itself. The need to balance multiple constitutional
protections between individuals and those who a state has a substantial
interest in specially protecting is not an easy task. To prevent a person or
status of people from accessing what has quickly become the most
96. Id. at 1739 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982)).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (defining commercial social media sites).
98. See generally Commonwealth v. Peebles, No. 72 MDA 2017, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
2927 (Aug. 4, 2017).
99. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.7 (detailing general registration requirements for criminal sex
offenders residing in North Carolina).
100. See Peebles, 2017 LEXIS 2927, at n.2 (citing Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733).
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significant forum for exchange of thought101 is averse to the fundamental
American belief that government should not abridge the right to freedom of
speech.102 However, the result in Packingham has opened the door to a
state’s ability to determine what interest is substantial enough for them to
regulate Internet speech.
MADELEINE BURNETTE-MCGRATH

101. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (citing Reno, 521 U.S., at 868).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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